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To address the growing economic and nancial crisis, many industrialized countries have
adopted scal stimulus measures. Most countries increased public spending on infrastructure,
in particular transportation networks (e.g., highways, mass transit, and airports).1 These
developments have revived interest in the debate on the macroeconomic eects of public
infrastructure investment. The present paper contributes to this literature by analyzing the
short-run, transitional, and long-run output eects of public investment for a small open
economy. More specically, we analyze how various assumptions on the rm's production
technology and the household's labor supply response aect the impulse responses and the
size of long-run output multipliers of public investment.
The notion that public capital generates benecial spillover eects to the private sector
is widely accepted in the empirical literature.2 The theoretical literature on the dynamic
allocation eects of public spending on infrastructure is less well developed. Most contribu-
tions employ a Ramsey framework in which households are innitely lived. Baxter and King
(1993) and Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), for instance, employ closed-economy models with
inelastic labor supply to analyze transitional and welfare eects of public investment shocks
under both distortionary and non-distortionary nancing scenarios. Fisher and Turnovsky
(1998) and Rioja (1999) explicitly focus on the eects of public capital congestion.3 The
open economy implications of public investment are little researched. A notable exception is
the nite-horizon model of Heijdra and Meijdam (2002), to which our work is most closely
related.
Public capital gives rise to positive spillover eects in private production and therefore may
enter the rm's production function in two ways: (i) as a separate input (direct eect); and (ii)
1Public infrastructure capital is dened to include, among others, highways, railways, airports, sewerage
and water systems, dams and other ood control structures, and lighthouse services. Public capital in a broad
sense also includes hospitals and educational buildings and other public buildings.
2Aschauer's (1989) seminal paper|which estimates an output elasticity of public capital of 0.39|gave a
strong boost to the empirical literature on public capital. The meta-analysis by Bom and Ligthart (2008) nds
estimates of the output elasticity of public capital in the range 0.08{0.15.
3A second strand of literature considers models in which the assumption of constant returns to scale to
reproducible factors of production generates endogenous growth. Barro (1990) and Glomm and Ravikumar
(1994, 1997) use endogenous growth models featuring innitely-lived households without a leisure-labor choice
to derive the conditions of optimal scal policy along the balanced growth path. Chatterjee (2008) focuses
rather on the short-run and long-run interhousehold distributional eects of public investment.
1via the index of factor productivity (indirect eect). The majority of studies, however, assume
a Cobb-Douglas production function, in which case the direct and indirect eects cannot be
disentangled.4 More important, public capital is always assumed to enter production in a
Hicks-neutral fashion, that is, it aects labor and capital productivity to the same extent.
The change in factor productivity in the US economy during the 20th century has neither
been Hicks neutral nor has it been Harrod neutral (i.e., labor augmenting).5 In addition, the
elasticity of substitution between private capital and labor is not necessarily unity. Empirical
evidence on this elasticity is mixed, ranging from 0 to 3.4 with the majority of estimates
falling into the range of 0.40{0.60 (cf. Chirinko, 2008). By choosing a more general functional
form, which embeds various elasticities of substitution, we are able to meaningfully analyze
the factor-augmenting role of public capital. We distinguish between Harrod-neutral public
capital and Solow-neutral (capital-augmenting) public capital. To our knowledge, the factor-
augmenting role of public capital has not been analyzed in a dynamic macroeconomic context
yet.6
We develop a microfounded dynamic macroeconomic model for a small open economy.
The household sector extends the Yaari (1965){Blanchard (1985) framework of overlapping
generations|which assumes that households face a constant probability of death|by mod-
eling endogenous labor supply.7 This extension is not only important in view of the emphasis
in the Real Business Cycle literature on the intertemporal labor supply eect for shock prop-
agation (cf. Prescott, 2006), but also because recent studies have demonstrated its empirical
relevance (e.g., Kimball and Shapiro, 2008). The model features an internationally traded
bond, ensuring that households can use the current account of the balance of payments to
smooth private consumption. Firms operate under perfect competition and enjoy production
spillovers from public capital. The presence of public capital yields a suboptimal market
outcome, providing a justication for government intervention. To limit the international
4Because the Cobb-Douglas function yields constant output elasticities of inputs, the literature has strongly
focused on this case (cf. Bom and Ligthart, 2008). Otto and Voss (1998) is a notable exception.
5See David and Van de Klundert (1965) and Boskin and Lau (2000).
6Feehan (1998) touches upon the issue, but employs a static two-factor, two-goods model of a small open
economy. In addition, he focuses on the ow rather than the stock of infrastructure.
7Heijdra and Meijdam (2002) neither model endogenous labor supply nor take into account dierent pro-
duction technologies.
2mobility of physical capital, and thus to avoid trivial capital dynamics, we postulate adjust-
ment costs of both private and public investment. The government balances its budget by
employing lump-sum taxes.
Our paper develops a simple graphical framework to analyze the qualitative steady-state
eects of a public investment shock. The framework is versatile because it incorporates the key
specications employed in the literature (e.g., exogenous labor supply, Hicks-neutral public
capital, a Cobb-Douglas production technology, and innitely-lived households) as special
cases. To get insight into the quantitative eects of public investment shocks over time,
we numerically simulate the model using empirically plausible parameter values taken from
the literature on small open economy models. We go beyond the standard practice of using
numerical impulse response functions by deriving analytical expressions for the transition
paths.
Innite-horizon models of a small open economy typically suer from the knife-edge prop-
erty (i.e., the rate of interest should equal the pure rate of interest for a meaningful steady
state to exist), thus yielding hysteresis. Introducing Yaari-Blanchard overlapping generations
is a convenient way to arrive at an endogenously determined (non-hysteretic) steady state.
Besides serving this technical objective, overlapping generations provide a realistic descrip-
tion of the demographic structure of the household sector. A key question is whether our
hysteresis-eliminating device aects the impulse responses of a scal shock. Therefore, an-
other objective of our paper is to compare the impulse responses in the non-hysteretic model
with those found in the hysteretic version of our model. More specically, we investigate the
robustness of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe's (2003) central result, that is, non-stationary and sta-
tionary models yield virtually identical impulse responses.8 Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003),
however, neither incorporate externalities in their model nor employ overlapping generations
as a stationarity-inducing device.
We show that while the type of factor-augmenting public capital does not matter for the
sign of the output multiplier, it aects its size. If public capital is Solow neutral and factors of
8Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) employ a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for a small open
economy and therefore speak of stationary and non-stationary models. In our deterministic setting, this
terminology corresponds to non-hysteretic and hysteretic models.
3production are gross complements, which is the empirically relevant case, the long-run output
multiplier falls short of its Hicks-neutral value. Conversely, the Solow-neutral case yields a
long-run output multiplier that exceeds the Hicks-neutral value if factors of production are
gross substitutes. Harrod-neutral public capital always yields a long-run output multiplier
equal to that found in the Hicks-neutral scenario. Second, the way in which public capital
aects factor productivity crucially matters for the dynamics of private capital and net foreign
assets, but yields qualitatively similar output dynamics. Finally, we show that the impulse
responses of a public investment shock in the nite-horizon model are very dierent from
those found in the innite-horizon model. The combination of a public capital externality,
endogenous labor supply, and nite horizons gives rise to non-monotonic output dynamics.
If any of these three elements is dropped from the analysis, we nd the conventional result
of monotonic transition paths. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe's (2003) result is not robust to the
inclusion of production externalities and is therefore not as generally valid as suggested.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a dynamic macroeconomic framework
for a small open economy in which public capital enters the production function in a factor-
augmenting fashion. Section 3 studies the steady state and develops a graphical framework.
Section 4 analyzes analytically and graphically the long-run eects of a public investment
shock nanced by lump-sum taxes. Section 5 studies numerically the dynamic macroeconomic
eects of an unanticipated and permanent increase in public investment. Section 6 summarizes
and concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a small open economy populated by overlapping generations of nitely-lived house-
holds and innitely-lived representative rms. The household section of the model extends
Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) by incorporating an endogenous labor-leisure choice along
the lines of Heijdra and Ligthart (2007). Firms enjoy positive spillover eects from the stock
of public infrastructure capital.
42.1 Households
Individual households face a constant probability of death   0, which is assumed to equal
the rate at which new agents are born. Because population growth is absent, the size of
the population can be normalized to unity. Households are disconnected and therefore do
not leave bequests. Ecient nancial markets allow households to borrow and lend at the
exogenously given world rate of interest (denoted by r) adjusted for the probability of death.





where  is the pure rate of time preference and the sub-utility index U(v;t) is a Cobb-Douglas
utility index dened over private consumption C(v;t) and leisure 1   L(v;t):
U(v;t)  C(v;t)"C [1   L(v;t)]
1 "C ; 0 < "C < 1; (2)
where L(v;t) denotes labor supply. Note that total time available to the household has been
normalized to unity. Equation (1) implies a unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution
and (2) imposes a unitary intratemporal elasticity of substitution between private consump-
tion and leisure. The household's ow budget constraint is:
_ A(v;t) = (r + )A(v;t) + w(t)L(v;t)   T(t)   C(v;t); (3)
where _ A(v;t)  dA(v;t)=dt, A(v;t) denotes real nancial wealth, w(t) is the (age-independent)
real wage rate, and T(t) are lump-sum taxes. Private consumption is used as numeraire com-
modity whose price has been normalized to unity. Households can contract actuarially fair
`reverse' life insurance (cf. Blanchard, 1985), implying an eective return on nancial wealth
equal to r + .
The representative household of cohort v, who is endowed with perfect foresight, maxi-
mizes lifetime utility (1){(2) subject to its budget identity (3) and a no-Ponzi game solvency
condition. We solve the household's problem by two-stage budgeting. In the rst stage, the




= r    > 0; (4)
where full consumption is dened as:
X(v;t)  w(t)[1   L(v;t)] + C(v;t): (5)
We study the case of a patient nation (i.e., r > ), which yields rising individual consump-
tion proles. In the second stage, full consumption is allocated over private consumption
and leisure. The rst-order conditions yield an expression for the consumption-leisure ratio:
C(v;t)
1 L(v;t) = "C
1 "Cw(t): Together with (5), this expression gives rise to demand functions for
goods consumption and leisure:
C(v;t) = "CX(v;t); (6)




Variables at the aggregate level can be calculated as a weighted sum of the values for dif-
ferent generations. For example, aggregate nancial wealth is A(t) 
R t
 1 A(v;t)e(v t)dv,
where e(v t) is the size of cohort v at time t. By aggregating (4) over all existing generations,
we arrive at aggregate full consumption:
_ X(t)
X(t)










The second line of equation (8) says that aggregate consumption growth equals individual
consumption growth (the rst term) minus the `generational turnover eect' (the second
term), that is, the wealth redistribution caused by the passing away of generations. Intuitively,
old generations have accumulated wealth over the course of their life, whereas new generations
9Further details on the mathematical derivations can be found in Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart (2010).
6are born without nancial wealth (i.e., A(t;t) = 0). Consequently, the consumption level of
new generations X(t;t) falls short of the average consumption level X(t).10
2.2 Firms
The representative rm produces a homogeneous good Y (t) under perfect competition. Tech-
nology is described by a constant elasticity of substitution function, which is linearly homo-
geneous in private capital K(t) and labor L(t). The public capital stock KG(t) enters private
production in a factor-augmenting fashion:











where 0 < Y  1 is the elasticity of substitution between private capital and labor,
0 < "Y < 1 is the eciency parameter of capital, and AK(t) and AL(t) are technology
functions:
Ai(t)  iKG(t)i; i = fK;Lg; (10)
where i represents the elasticity of the technology function and i > 0 is a scaling factor.
Hicks-neutral public capital can be represented by K = L =  > 0,11 Harrod-neutral
(or labor-augmenting) public capital assumes L > K = 0, and Solow-neutral (or capital-
augmenting) public capital is described by K > L = 0.12 If Y = 1, then (9) collapses to
a Cobb-Douglas function, in which case the distinction between the various types of factor-
augmenting public capital is immaterial.
Equation (9) incorporates a public capital externality, which gives rise to K(t)+L(t)+




Y (t) > 0 represents the output elasticity of factor j =
10We use X(t) = ( + )[A(t) + H(t)] and X(t;t) = ( + )H(t), where H(t) is `full' human wealth, that
is, the after-tax value of the household's time endowment: H(t) 
R 1
t [w()   T()]e
(r+)(t )d:
11Equation (10) boils down to AL(t) = AK(t) = KG(t)
, where L = K = . If we also set Y = 1,
equation (9) reduces to Heijdra and Meijdam's (2002) production technology.
12Of course, intermediate cases such as K > 0 and L > 0 (with K 6= L) are feasible. Here, we focus on
the pure types of factor-augmenting public capital only.
7fK;L;KGg.13 The output share of public capital can be written as
G(t) = K(t)K + L(t)L: (11)
To ensure diminishing returns with respect to broad capital (and thus exclude endogenous
growth), we impose  = G < 1   K in the case of Hicks-neutral public capital. The Solow-
neutral case requires K(1+K) < 1, whereas no conditions are needed for the Harrod-neutral
case. For plausible parameter combinations, these conditions are easily met (see Section 5.1).
To avoid trivial capital dynamics, we introduce adjustment costs in private investment.
Net capital formation is linked to gross investment I(t) according to a concave accumulation











where  is the (constant) rate of capital depreciation and () is the installation cost function
of private capital accumulation, which satises (0) = 0; 0() > 0; and 00() < 0 (where
primes denote derivatives). The degree of physical capital mobility of private capital is given
by 0 < A    I
K
00()
0()  1. A small A|representing a less concave installation cost
function|characterizes a high degree of physical capital mobility.





[Y ()   w()L()   I()]er(t )d; (13)
subject to the capital accumulation constraint (12) and the economy-wide stock of public
capital. The prices of output and investment goods are normalized to unity. To allow for
meaningful production spillovers, we require that the government cannot charge a user fee on
13Some authors assume constant returns to scale across all inputs (e.g., Aschauer, 1989) with a view to
model congestion eects. In our context, however, public capital is modeled as a pure public good.
8the services of public capital, for example, road toll fees. The optimality conditions are:





















where q(t) denotes Tobin's q, which is dened as the market value of private capital relative
to its replacement costs, and Yj(t) 
@Y (t)
@j(t) > 0 represents the marginal productivity of factor
j = fK;L;KGg. Equation (14) describes labor demand, (15) represents investment demand,
and (16) shows the evolution of Tobin's q.14 The ratio of marginal products of the private



















If private production factors are gross substitutes (i.e., Y > 1) and public capital is capital-
augmenting (i.e., K   L > 0), an increase in KG(t) increases the relative marginal product
of private capital. Thus, public capital is biased toward private capital. If private factors are
gross complements (i.e., Y < 1) and K  L > 0, an increase in KG(t) increases the relative
marginal product of labor. Thus, public capital is biased toward labor.
2.3 Government and Foreign Sector
The government invests in public capital IG(t) and consumes goods CG(t). To focus solely
on spillovers of public investment on the production side, we assume that public consumption
does not give rise to spillovers on the consumption side. Total public spending is nanced by
lump-sum taxes, implying that CG(t) + IG(t) = T(t) holds at each instant of time. Just like
14Without adjustment costs, we have () = I(t)=K(t) and 
0() = 1, which yields A = 0. Equation (15)
then reduces to q = 1. In this case, K(t) adjusts instantaneously to its steady-state level. Consequently,
equation (16) reduces to YK = r + ; which is the familiar rental rate derived in a static framework.















where G is the rate of depreciation of public capital and G () is the installation cost function
of public capital, which satises G(0) = 0; 0
G() > 0; and 00
G() < 0. The parameter G
represents the elasticity of the public capital installation cost function.
Foreign nancial capital is perfectly mobile across borders. The change in net foreign
assets _ F(t) follows from the current account of the balance of payments: _ F(t) = rF(t)+Z(t);
where rF(t) denotes the return on net foreign assets and net exports are given by: Z(t) 
Y (t)   C(t)   CG(t)   I(t)   IG(t).
2.4 Market Equilibrium
The domestic labor market clears at each instant of time. Similarly, goods markets do not
feature any rigidities, so that Y (t) = C(t)+CG(t)+I(t)+IG(t)+Z(t). Portfolio equilibrium
amounts to A(t) = V (t) + F(t), where V (t) = q(t)K(t) denotes the rm's stock market
value. Assets in the household's portfolio are assumed to be perfect substitutes. Initially,
A(0) = V (0) > 0 because K(0) > 0 and F(0) = 0, implying that the trade account of the
balance of payments is initially balanced; physical capital is thus fully domestically owned.
3 Solving the Model
This section studies the steady state and develops a graphical framework to analyze the
dynamic eects of a public investment impulse.
3.1 Steady State
To solve the model, we log-linearize it around an initial steady state in which F(0) = 0.
A tilde (~) denotes a relative change, for example, ~ X(t)  dX(t)=X0, where X0 denotes
the initial steady-state value of full consumption.15 Notable exceptions are nancial assets
15We use the subscript 0 to denote the initial steady-state value of a given variable.
10and lump-sum taxes. For nancial assets A(t) and F(t), we use ~ A(t)  rdA(t)=Y0 and
_ ~ A(t)  rd _ A(t)=Y0, whereas the change in lump-sum taxes is scaled by steady-state output Y0
only, that is, ~ T(t)  dT(t)=Y0.
The reduced-form dynamic model contains two predetermined variables (i.e., the private
capital stock and nancial assets) and two non-predetermined variables (i.e., Tobin's q and
full consumption). By collecting variables in the vector ~ z(t)  [ ~ K(t) ~ q(t) ~ X(t) ~ A(t)]0 and
shock terms in the vector  (t)  [0 q(t) 0 A(t)]0 we can write the dynamic system as:
_ ~ z(t) = ~ z(t)    (t); (19)











Y !A (1   yk) r   rK
Y !Ayx 0
0 0 r     r 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where !A  rA0=Y0 denotes the output share of asset income, !I  I0=Y0 is the output share
of private investment, !w  w0=Y0 is the output share of wages, !X  X0=Y0 denotes the
output share of full consumption, and yk > 0, yx < 0, wk > 0, and wx > 0 are dened in




[yg + (Y   1)K](1   e Gt)~ IG; (20)
A(t)   r

!wwg(1   e Gt)   !I
G
 ~ IG + r!C
G ~ CG; (21)
where !C
G  CG0=Y0, !I
G  IG0=Y0, and yg T 0 and wg T 0 are dened in Appendix A.1.
Because we are studying a public investment impulse, we set ~ IG > 0 and ~ CG = 0.
The model has a unique and locally saddle-point stable steady state, featuring two positive
real roots and two negative real roots (Appendix A.1). The system (19) embeds various special
cases. First, if labor supply is exogenous (i.e.,  23    rK
Y !Ayx = 0), the system is recursive,
meaning that the investment subsystem [~ q(t); ~ K(t)] can be solved independent of the savings
11subsystem [ ~ X(t); ~ A(t)]. Second, if households are innitely lived (imposing  = 0 and thus
r =  must hold for a steady state to exist) then the third row of  consists of zeros only. The
four characteristic roots in the innite-horizon case are:  h
1 = (r  
p
r2 + 4 12 21)=2 < 0,
r
1 = r, h
2 = 0; and r
2 = (r +
p
r2 + 4 12 21)=2 > 0. A hysteretic steady state is obtained if
a zero root is present.
3.2 Graphical Framework
Figure 1 graphically summarizes the model's long-run equilibrium, which is simultaneously
determined in four panels. The economy is initially at the steady-state equilibrium E0. Panel
(a) shows the equilibrium on the private capital market. The long-run supply of private capital
Ks(r) is perfectly elastic in a small open economy, and can thus be graphically represented
by a horizontal line. Using the steady-state versions of (12) and (16), the long-run capital








which is downward sloping since @YK=@K < 0. The intersection of capital supply Ks(r)
and capital demand Kd(r;L0;KG0;q0) determines the initial steady-state level of capital






[G + K(Y   1)]: (23)
Hence, an increase in public capital shifts the capital demand curve to the right if G +
K(Y   1) > 0. In the Solow-neutral case, this condition implies that Y > L. We label
the shift in the capital demand curve the capital-productivity eect, which consists of the
pure externality eect G and the Solow-substitution eect K(Y  1). Only for K > 0 and
Y 6= 1 does the Solow substitution eect play a role; its value is small for complementary
private inputs. Because @YK=@L > 0, the capital demand curve always shifts to the right if
employment increases.
Panel (b) depicts the equilibrium in the labor market. For a given level of full consumption,





which follows from (7) in aggregate form. A rise in full consumption induces households
to work less|the wealth eect on labor supply|and thus shifts the labor supply curve
to left, thereby pushing wages up and depressing employment. The labor demand curve
Ld(w;K0;KG0) is derived from the marginal productivity of labor (14):
w = YL(L;K0;KG0); (25)
which is downward sloping because @YL=@L < 0. For K = K0, KG = KG0, and X = X0, the
equilibrium employment level and wage rate are L0 and w0, respectively. The eect of public






[G + L(Y   1)]: (26)
Thus, an increase in public capital shifts the labor demand curve to right if G+L(Y  1) >
0, causing wages and employment to rise. We call this the labor-productivity eect, which
consists of the pure externality eect G and the Harrod-substitution eect L(Y  1). Since
@YL=@K > 0, a larger private capital stock also pushes the labor demand curve to the right.
Panel (d) determines initial full consumption and the stock of assets for given wages
and lump-sum taxes. The modied Keynes-Ramsey schedule Xkr(A) gives the steady-state





The Xkr(A) schedule is upward sloping because of the generational turnover eect. The vari-
ables X and A must also satisfy the steady-state household budget identity Xhb(A;w0;KG0)
13that follows from (3):
X = rA + w0   CG0    1(G)KG0; (28)
where we used the steady-state version of (18) and the government's budget constraint. Given
KG = KG0 and w = w0, the intersection of the Xkr(A) and Xhb(A;w0;KG0) schedules
determines the initial steady-state levels of full consumption X0 and nancial assets A0. A
rise in the wage rate shifts the Xhb() curve up, resulting in a higher equilibrium level of
assets.
Finally, Panel (c) shows the production function Y (), which relates output to private
capital given labor and public capital. With initial levels of inputs of L0, K0, and KG0, initial
output is Y0. Panel (c) also depicts the line qK. Because A0 = qK0 (point G), foreign assets
in the initial steady state are zero, that is, F0 = 0.
As a result of an investment shock, the value of Tobin's q deviates from q(0) = q(1) in
the short and medium run. To graphically analyze the dynamics during this time period, we
make use of Figure 2. The _ q = 0 locus in Panel (a) shows combinations of q(t) and K(t)
for which Tobin's q is constant over time; it is also given by (22) with xed r and variable
q. The schedule is downward sloping because a higher capital stock reduces the marginal
product of capital and thus yields lower dividends to shareholders. The _ K = 0 locus denotes
combinations of q(t) and K(t) for which net investment is zero. The schedule is horizontal
at the unique value of Tobin's q for which () = . Panel (b) illustrates the labor market
dynamics by adding the short- and medium-term labor-productivity and wealth eects to
Panel (b) of Figure 1. Recall that because the dynamic system is not recursive the dynamic
equilibrium paths are simultaneously determined in the investment subsystem [Panel (a)] and
saving subsystem (not shown), which are connected by the endogenously determined level of
employment (see Section 3.1).
144 Analytical Long-Run Eects of Public Investment
This section analytically investigates the long-run eects of a permanent and unanticipated
increase in public investment. The scal shock is unanticipated in the sense that it is simul-
taneously announced and implemented. To keep its budget balanced, the government raises
lump-sum taxes.
The increase in public investment expands the steady-state stock of public capital from








Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows that the increase in public capital has two opposite eects on
the labor market. On the one hand, the labor-productivity eect shifts the labor demand
curve to the right from Ld(w;K0;KG0) to Ld(w;K1;KG1), thereby boosting employment
and wages. On the other hand, the wealth eect on labor supply causes a leftward shift of
the labor supply curve from Ls(w;X0) to Ls(w;X1), further increasing wages but partially
osetting the increase in employment.16 The new steady-state equilibrium is denoted by E1.
The labor-productivity eect always dominates the wealth eect, resulting in a net increase


































where !LL  (1 L0)=L0 is the leisure-labor ratio (or intertemporal substitution elasticity of
labor supply).18 The rst term of (30) represents the labor-productivity eect and the second
16The wealth eect derives from the fact that|for plausible parameter values|the rise in gross wages
dominates the increase in lump-sum taxes necessary to balance the government budget. In Panel (d) of Figure
1, the X
hb() curve shifts up to X
hb(A;w1;KG1), raising full consumption to X1 and nancial assets to A1.
17Using equation (8) in steady state yields ( + )   r(r   ) = ( + )(!X   !A)=!X > 0, where
!X   !A > 0.
18Note that the intertemporal substitution elasticity of labor supply is equivalent to the intratemporal
15term captures the wealth eect. Since both eects contribute to raise the wage rate, the wage
multiplier given by (31) is positive. Of course, in the absence of a public capital externality
(i.e., YG0 = 0 and thus G = 0), we nd a zero eect on wages.
Public capital has a direct eect on private capital demand, which is captured by the
capital productivity eect described by (23). Also, because labor and private capital are
cooperative factors, public capital has an indirect eect on private capital through its eect






























where y  Y0=K0 and yG  Y0=KG0. The rst term of (32) is the capital-productivity eect.
The second and third terms capture the eect of public investment on employment and cor-
respond to the labor-productivity and wealth eects, respectively. If public capital is Harrod
neutral (i.e., K = 0) or factors of production are gross substitutes (i.e., Y > 1) or both,
then the multiplier of private capital tends to be positive (see also Section 5). Graphically,
public investment shifts the capital demand curve to the right for a given interest rate|as
depicted in Panel (a) of Figure 1|causing an increase in the long-run stock of private capital
from K0 to K1. However, if public capital is Solow neutral and factors of production are
strong gross complements, then the negative Solow-substitution eect dominates the positive
pure externality eect so as to render the capital-productivity eect also negative. In this
case, the net eect of public investment on private capital may be negative if the negative
capital-productivity eect more than osets the positive indirect eect spilling over from the
labor market.
If employment, private capital, and public capital increase, then output also rises to Y1.
compensated wage elasticity of labor supply.






























where we have totally dierentiated (9) and made use of (29), (30), and (32). The two terms
in the rst line of (33) correspond to the capital-productivity and labor-productivity eects,
whereas the negative term in the second line represents the wealth eect. The most important
result from (33) is that the output multiplier is smaller if private inputs are gross complements
(i.e., Y < 1) and public capital is Solow neutral (i.e., K > 0). In this case, public capital is
biased toward the relative expensive factor (labor) and substitutability to the relative cheap
factor (private capital) is rather limited, which leads to lower private capital accumulation.
In contrast, if public capital is labor-augmenting (i.e., L > 0 and K = 0), then the elasticity
of substitution between private inputs is irrelevant to the size of the multiplier, reecting the
availability of private capital at a xed user cost.
Equation (33) embeds several other special cases. First, if labor supply is exogenous (i.e.,
!LL = 0) the second and third terms of (33)|whose net eect is positive|drop out, implying
that the output multiplier is larger if labor supply is endogenous.19 Second, if agents are
innitely-lived (i.e.,  = 0) only the negative wealth eect drops out, which implies an even
larger output multiplier. Finally, if public capital is not productive (i.e., YG = G = K = 0),
then only the negative component of the wealth eect remains; we thus obtain the output






Panel (c) of Figure 1 shows the long-run eect of public investment on output. The
increase in employment and public capital shifts up the production function Y (K;L0;KG0)
to Y (K;L1;K1). The new steady-state equilibrium is denoted by E1, with a larger private
capital stock K1 and higher output Y1. The slope of the production function is the same
19It can easily be shown that since the labor-productivity eect dominates the wealth eect in equation (30),
so does it in (32) and (33).
20The macroeconomic eects of unproductive public investment and public consumption are identical. In this
case, the positive output multiplier stems entirely from the wealth eect; intuitively, the lump-sum tax increase





17at E1 and E0, since I=K, IG=KG, Tobin's q, and thus YK() [see (16)] are xed in the long
run. The stock market value of domestic rms increases to qK1 (point N). However, Panel
(d) shows that public investment also raises total domestic nancial assets to A1 (point
M). Thus, the dierence (represented by the distance between N and M) gives the long-run
eect of public investment on net foreign assets, which may be either positive or negative,
depending on the long-run change in the stock of private capital relative to the change in
domestic nancial assets.21
5 Quantitative Analysis of the Eects of Public Investment
To quantify and visualize the dynamic macroeconomic eects of an increase in public invest-
ment, a simulation is performed. Section 5.1 describes the parameters used in the simulation,
Section 5.2 illustrates the transitional dynamics, and Section 5.3 provides numerical results
on both the short-run and long-run eects.
5.1 Parameters
Table 1 shows the parameter values that are taken from the literature. The time unit repre-
sents a year. We follow Mendoza (1991), who calibrates a dynamic general equilibrium model
for the Canadian economy, in assigning values to !LL, r, and . In the benchmark model,
the intertemporal substitution elasticity of labor supply !LL is set to 2:00, the rate of interest
takes on a value of 0.04, and the rate of depreciation of private and public capital is 0.1. Based
on an average expected life span of 55 (working) years, we assume a probability of death  of
1.82 percent. Following Baxter and King (1993), the ratio of public consumption to GDP is
set to 20 percent, whereas the ratio of private consumption to GDP is 0.55, which is in line
with the average value for OECD countries. The ratio of public investment to GDP takes
on a value of 0.05, which is slightly above the OECD average. Based on Bom and Ligthart's
(2008) analysis, we use G = 0:08. Initially, we set Y to unity, which is in line with the
Cobb-Douglas specication employed in most empirical studies.
21Panel (c) of Figure 1 shows the case dF(1)=dIG < 0, which holds for reasonable parameter values in the
cases of Hicks-neutral and Harrod-neutral public capital. See Section 5.3.
18We employ a logarithmic specication for both the private and public installation cost
function:
(x)   z ln
x +  z
 z
; G(x)   zG ln
xG +  zG
 zG
; (34)
where  z and  zG are exogenous constants, x  I=K, and xG  IG=KG. From (34) and the
denitions of A and G, we derive A = x=(x +  z) and G =  zGxG=(xG +  zG). We set
the steady-state values for x at 0.11 and choose  z = 0:532, implying steady-state adjustment
costs of about 0.2 percent of output. Similarly, we use xG = 0:11 and pick  zG = 0:532
to yield identical adjustment costs for public capital as for private capital. The degree of
private capital mobility is A = 0:171 and the elasticity of the public installation function is
G = 0:091.
Given the xed rate of interest, our parametrization under nite horizons yields rising
individual consumption proles, that is, r >  = 0:0388, where  is used as a calibration
parameter to arrive at A0 = q0K0.22 Once the parameters are set, all other information on the
spending shares, output elasticities, and the output-capital ratio can be derived: !I = 0:20,
L = 0:71, K = 0:29, "C = 0:28, "Y = 0:29, y = 0:55, and yG = 2:20. The conditions
 < 1 K = 0:71 and K(1+ K) = 0:37 < 1 are thus easily met. Depending on the type of
factor-augmenting public capital, we can derive K or L using (11); that is, K = G=K =
0:276 and L = 0 for Solow-neutral public capital and L = G=L = 0:113 and K = 0 for
Harrod-neutral public capital, and K = L = 0:08 for Hicks-neutral public capital. Of the
four real roots, two are stable and two are unstable; we nd  h
1 =  0:1576;  h
2 =  0:0172;
r
1 = 0:0584; and r
2 = 0:1976.
5.2 Impulse Responses
To visualize the impulse responses of a permanent and unanticipated rise in public investment
nanced by lump-sum taxes, we use the analytical expressions (A.23){(A.26) in Appendix
A.2 together with the steady-state log-linearized equations of Table A1. We plot the im-
22For the special case of innite horizons, we set r = .
19pulse response functions for 200 time periods, which allows us to accommodate dierences in
transition speed of variables. The impact (or short-run) eect of the scal shock occurs at
t = 0 and the steady-state (or long-run) eect materializes at t ! 1. The size of the scal
shock amounts to ~ IG = 0:1. We rst discuss the dynamic linkages between the variables for
Hicks-neutral public capital, which allows us to focus on the eect of endogenous labor supply.
Subsequently, we relax the Hicks-neutrality assumption and turn to our parametrization of
interest.
5.2.1 Hicks-Neutral Public Capital
The dotted lines in Figure 3 show the transitional dynamics for Hicks-neutral public capital.
On impact, Tobin's q jumps up, in anticipation of the future increase in the marginal produc-
tivity of private capital. Consequently, private investment rises. In Panel (a) of Figure 2, the
economy moves from E0 to EH
1 . Given the (future) increase in wages, households experience
a rise in total wealth, inducing them to reduce labor supply.23 As a result, wages increase
and employment falls on impact. Graphically, in Panel (b), the labor supply curve shifts to
the left to Ls
1, while the labor demand schedule remains unaected, yielding the short-run
equilibrium E1. Given that private capital is predetermined, the private capital-labor ratio
rises and output falls in the short run. The rise in short-run domestic absorption (denoted by
~ C(0) + ~ I(0) + ~ IG > 0) together with the fall in output implies that the country's net exports
fall (i.e., ~ Z(0) < 0).
The increase in public investment expands the public capital stock over time. Similarly,
the private capital stock rises gradually, owing to the larger private investment rate. In terms
of Panel (a) of Figure 2, the economy gradually moves from EH
1 to EH
2 along the dynamic
path DPH. Because private capital and labor are cooperative factors of production, the
marginal productivity of labor rises. In Panel (b), the labor demand curve shifts to the right
to Ld
2. Labor supply shifts further to the left, reecting a rise in full consumption. The
employment path during transition is non-monotonic. Initially, during periods 10-30, the
labor-productivity eect of both private and public capital is rather strong and dominates
23Private investment `crowds in' private consumption; this result is in contrast to the conventional negative
eect found by Heijdra and Ligthart (2007).
20the wealth eect. Graphically, the rightward shift of the labor demand curve dominates the
leftward shift of the labor supply schedule, causing a net increase in wages and employment.
Once the economy reaches the temporary equilibrium E2, employment attains its maximum.
Eventually, during periods 30 and beyond, the rise in wages boosts the wealth eect on labor
supply. Graphically, the labor supply curve shifts to the left to a greater extent than in the
initial periods|which is represented by a move from Ls
2 to Ls
1|pushing wages further up,
but depressing the employment increment. However, both employment and wages increase in
the long run, as indicated by the location of the new steady state E1 to the Northeast of E0.
The drop in the employment increment in the medium run causes the capital-labor ratio
to rise. As a result, Tobin's q gradually decreases over time, eventually returning to its
initial steady-state value at EH
1. Therefore, the transition in Tobin's q|and thus in the
private capital stock|is also non-monotonic. Private and full consumption, however, increase
monotonically during transition, reecting a continuous rise in wage income. The rise in
domestic absorption boosts imports, deteriorates the trade balance, and creates a short-run
current account decit. Hence, the country accumulates net foreign debt. During transition,
the current account decit shrinks, giving rise to a non-monotonic path of net foreign assets.
In the new steady state, the current account of the balance of payments is balanced again
(i.e., _ F(1) = 0), where a surplus on the trade account osets the interest payments on net
foreign debt.
5.2.2 Solow-Neutral and Harrod-Neutral Public Capital
To distinguish between dierent types of factor-augmentation, we focus on the case of 0 <
Y < 1. The dashed and solid lines in Figure 3 present impulse responses of a public in-
vestment shock for Harrod-neutral and Solow-neutral public capital, respectively. Section
4 showed that the elasticity of substitution is irrelevant in the long run if public capital is
Harrod neutral; apart from slight short-run dierences, it turns out that also the transitional
dynamics are virtually identical to the Hicks-neutral case.24 In contrast, under Solow neu-
trality the transitional dynamics dier qualitatively for private capital and foreign assets, but
24In both technology cases, the Solow-substitution eect K(Y  1) of equation (23) drops out, leaving only
the pure externality eect on the medium-run marginal productivity of private capital.
21are only quantitatively dierent for output.
In the Solow-neutral case, Tobin's q jumps down to ES
1, resulting in a decrease in private
investment in the short run. Consequently, the stock of private capital gradually reduces. As
the public capital stock expands, the marginal productivity of labor increases, which boosts
employment (recall from (17) that in this case public capital is biased toward labor). The
increase in labor use raises the marginal productivity of capital, Tobin's q, and thus private
investment. Eventually, net private investment turns positive so that the private capital stock
expands back to the pre-shock level, causing the graphical swing in Panel (a) from ES
1 to ES
2
along the dynamic path DPS. However, over time the decrease in the employment increment
causes Tobin's q and private investment to fall again, which creates a drop in long-run private
capital accumulation. Graphically, the economy follows the dynamic path DPS from ES
2 to
the new steady state ES
1.
In the Harrod-neutral case, Tobin's q jump down from E0 to some point (not shown) above
ES
1 in Panel (a) of Figure 2, which temporarily depresses private investment to a smaller extent
than in the Solow-neutral case. As public capital accumulates, the marginal productivity of
private capital increases, thereby pushing Tobin's q up. As a result, private investment rises
and the private capital stock expands, which moves the economy in the direction of EH
2 ,
following a dynamic path similar to DPH. As in the Hicks-neutral case, once employment
attains its maximum at E2 in Panel (b), Tobin's q starts adjusting back to its original level. In
Panel (a), the economy moves along the dynamic path DPH from EH
2 to the new steady-state
equilibrium EH
1.
The dynamics of net foreign assets also depend on the technology scenario. Under Solow-
neutral public capital, the stock of net foreign assets increases in the new steady state, whereas
it drops in the Harrod-neutral case. The reason lies in the larger rise in imports due to the
higher private investment rate in the latter case. In contrast to the dynamics for capital and
net foreign assets, the impulse responses for labor are nearly identical across specications.
Although the short-run eects on labor are slightly dierent for dierent values of Y and i,
the three lines for employment coincide in the long run. Intuitively, the steady-state eect on
wages and employment is only aected by YG(), that is, the size of the pure public capital
22externality [see equations (30){(31)].
5.2.3 Comparison of Hysteretic and Non-Hysteretic Models
Output shows a non-monotonic transition path in the benchmark scenario, which crucially
depends on the assumptions made on the labor supply elasticity, the life span of agents, and
the presence of a public capital externality. The dotted lines in Figure 4 show monotonic
transition paths for output if labor supply is exogenous, households have innite horizons,
and public capital does not give rise to a production externality. If labor supply is exogenous
(i.e., !LL = 0), there is no wealth eect on labor supply. In this case, output and private
consumption do not react on impact.25 In the long run, consumption and output multipliers
are both positive. If households have innite life spans (i.e.,  = 0 so that r = ), full
consumption dynamics is degenerate, that is, _ X = 0. In that case, full consumption jumps
on impact and stays constant over time. Intuitively, all future changes in disposable income
are fully anticipated and already reected in the initial jump in full consumption, so that
there are no further leftward shifts in the Ls(w;X) curve during transition. Consequently, no
wiggle is present in the output path.
Although not analyzed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), nite horizons can be used
to arrive at an endogenously-determined steady state.26 A key question is whether using a
hysteresis-eliminating device, such as overlapping generations, aects the impulse responses.
Panels (a){(c) of Figure 4 show that the impulse responses of the hysteretic (innite-horizon)
model|as represented by the dotted lines|are very dierent from those found in the non-
hysteretic (nite-horizon) model. This result contradicts Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe's (2003)
primary nding that the non-stationary model and the stationary model yield nearly identical
impulse responses. Only in the absence of a production externality can we replicate their
result. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe's (2003) result is thus not as generally valid as suggested.
25The rise in wages without a wealth eect is smaller than in the benchmark case with a wealth eect
present.
26Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) discuss ve ways to `close small open models:' (i) an endogenous discount
factor; (ii) a debt-elastic interest rate premium; (iii) convex portfolio adjustment costs; and (iv) complete asset
markets. They show that the type of device does not matter.
235.3 Quantitative Short-Run and Long-Run Eects
Table 2 presents macroeconomic multipliers for the benchmark scenario and alternative values
of the output elasticity of public capital G and substitution elasticity in production Y .
The long-run output multiplier in the benchmark scenario is 2.71, whereas the short-run
multiplier is negative, suggesting substantial long-term output gains from investment in public
capital. The case of exogenous labor supply (i.e., !LL = 0) and Hicks-neutral public capital|
which corresponds to Heijdra and Meijdam's (2002) model, but is not shown in the table|
yields a long-run output multiplier of 2.25. Abstracting from endogenous labor supply thus
underestimates the long-run output multiplier. Output multipliers do not change sign across
various values of G and Y . A larger output elasticity of public capital|and thus a larger
production externality|increases the marginal productivity of private capital. Consequently,
the steady-state investment and output multipliers both rise. If the public capital externality
is absent, the long-run output multiplier is only marginally above unity.27 In contrast to the
case with a public capital externality, short-run employment rises, reecting a fall in aggregate
household wealth induced by the rise in lump-sum taxes necessary to balance the government
budget.
Although the sign of the long-run output multiplier is independent of the type of factor-
augmenting public capital, its size is substantially aected. The elasticity of substitution
plays an important role if public capital is Solow neutral. We nd a long-run output multiplier
that falls short of that found in the Hicks-neutral scenario if factors of production are gross
complements; the output multiplier amounts to 1.59 compared to 2.71 in the benchmark
scenario. Both short-run and long-run investment multipliers may take on negative values.
Conversely, if factors of production are gross substitutes and public capital is Solow neutral,
the long-run output multiplier exceeds that found in the Hicks-neutral case. In absolute terms,
the response of net foreign assets is much larger than that of physical capital. Under Harrod
neutrality, the long-run output multiplier is equal to that found under Hicks neutrality. As
expected from the analytical results, both long-run wage and employment multipliers are
27Note that the output multiplier may fall below unity if the labor supply elasticity is small. For example,
for G = 0 and !LL = 1, we nd an output multiplier of 0.85.
24independent of Y and i.
6 Conclusions
The paper develops a dynamic microfounded macroeconomic model of a small open economy
to study the transitional dynamics of a balanced-budget increase in public investment. Public
capital gives rise to an externality by entering private production in a factor-augmenting
fashion. Various forms of factor-augmenting public capital are distinguished. The household
side of the model extends a Yaari-Blanchard overlapping generations model|which gives
rise to a non-hysteretic steady state|by introducing a wealth eect on intertemporal labor
supply.
The paper shows that the type of factor-augmenting public capital matters for the size
of the output multiplier, but does not aect its sign. The long-run output multiplier for
the empirically plausible case of Solow-neutral public capital and low input substitutability
amounts to 1.59, which is substantially smaller than the value of 2.71 that is found if public
capital is Hicks neutral. The size of the long-run output multiplier under Harrod-neutral
public capital is identical to that under Hicks neutrality. Endogenous labor supply and
larger elasticities of substitution between private capital and labor boost the long-run output
multiplier.
The type of factor-augmenting public capital matters to the transitional dynamics of
a public investment shock. Qualitatively similar output dynamics of a public investment
impulse are found for various types of factor-augmenting public capital. Transition paths for
private capital and net foreign assets, however, dier substantially. If factors of production
are gross complements and public capital is Solow neutral (i.e., public capital is labor biased),
the path of the private capital stock shows an initial fall, followed by a rise, and a subsequent
decline in the new steady state. Long-run net foreign assets increase, sustaining a long-run
current account surplus. If public capital is Harrod or Hicks neutral, then the non-monotonic
path for private capital always lies above the zero axis, whereas the stock of net foreign assets
always falls.
25In contrast to conventional results obtained in hysteretic (innite-horizon) models for a
small open economy, the output dynamics of a public investment shock in the non-hysteretic
(nite-horizon) model are non-monotonic. A necessary condition for this result is the simulta-
neous presence of a public capital externality, endogenous labor supply, and nite horizons of
households. Our results demonstrate that Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe's (2003) central nding|
i.e., the impulse responses of hysteretic and non-hysteretic models are virtually identical|is
not as generally valid as suggested. Impulse responses of the hysteretic and the non-hysteretic
model are only identical without a production externality.
Our study does not analyze the intergenerational welfare eects of an increase in public
investment. We leave this for further research. In addition, the analysis assumes that the
government has access to lump-sum taxes. In future work, we want to study the dynamic
macroeconomic eects of alternative ways to balance the government's budget, that is, labor















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Figure 3. Permanent Public Investment Shock under Various Types of
Factor-Augmenting Public Capital
~ Y (t) ~ q(t)
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Notes: The dashed line denotes the scenario of Y = 0:5 and K = 0 (Harrod-neutral case), the
solid line represents Y = 0:5 and L = 0 (Solow-neutral case), and the dotted line represents
Y = 1 and K = L (Hicks-neutral case). The other parameters are set at their benchmark
values.Figure 4. Impulse Responses of a Permanent Public Investment Shock:
Various Values of !LL, , and G
Panel (a): ~ Y (t) and ~ C(t) for various !LL values














































Panel (b): ~ Y (t) and ~ C(t) for various  values
















































Panel (c): ~ Y (t) and ~ C(t) for various G values















































Notes: In Panel (a), !LL takes on the values 0 (dotted line), 0:50 (dashed line), and 2:00 (solid
line). In Panel (b),  takes on the values 0 (dotted line), 0:0182 (solid line), and 0:05 (dashed
line), respectively. In Panel (c), G takes on the values 0 (dotted line), 0:05 (dashed line), and 0:08
(solid line). The other parameters are set at their benchmark values.Table 1: The Parameter Values in the Benchmark Model
Description Parameter Value
Birth rate  0.018
Rate of interest r 0.040
Depreciation rate of private capital  0.100
Depreciation rate of public capital G 0.100
Leisure-labor ratio !LL 2.000
Elasticity of substitution between labor and private capital Y 1.000
Ratio of private consumption to GDP !C 0.550
Ratio of public consumption to GDP !C
G 0.200
Ratio of public investment to GDP !I
G 0.050
Output elasticity of public capital G 0.080
Parameter of the installation function for private capital  z 0.532









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This Appendix derives the log-linearized model, analyzes stability, and solves for the short-
run, transitional, and long-run eects of a public investment shock. Further details are
provided in Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart (2010)
A.1 The Reduced-Form Model
We log-linearize the nite-horizon model around an initial steady state in which F(0) = 0
so that A(0) = q(0)K(0).28 The results are reported in Table A.1. A tilde (~) denotes a
relative change, for example, ~ X(t)  dX(t)=X0, where X0 denotes the initial steady-state
value of full consumption. For nancial assets A(t) and F(t), we use ~ A(t)  rdA(t)=Y0
and _ ~ A(t)  rd _ A(t)=Y0. Lump-sum taxes are scaled by steady-state output Y0 only, that is,
~ T(t)  dT(t)=Y0.
A.1.1 The Quasi-Reduced Form of the Static System
Conditional on the state variables and the policy shocks (see below), equations (TA.7){(TA.9)




































Y L ~ KG(t)
~ K(t)







where !LL  (1   L0)=L0  0 is the leisure-labor ratio and ~ K(t) denotes broad capital:
~ K(t) = K ~ K(t) + G ~ KG(t): (A.2)
Using ~ KG(t) =
 
1   e Gt ~ IG, we nd:
~ K(t) = K ~ K(t) + G

1   e Gt ~ IG: (A.3)
28In the special case of innite horizons ( = 0 and thus r = ), we set F(0) =  q(0)K(0) to arrive at
A(0) = 0.









































> 0; yx   
L!LLY
Y + !LLK
< 0; yg 
G(Y + !LL)   (1   Y )!LLLL
Y + !LLK
;




> 0; lx   
!LLY
Y + !LLK
< 0; lg 
!LL[G + L(Y   1)]
Y + !LLK
;




> 0; wx 
!LLK
Y + !LLK
> 0; wg 
G + L(Y   1)
Y + !LLK
:
A.1.2 Stability of the Dynamic System
Solving the dynamic system (19) gives rise to a fourth-order characteristic polynomial:
P(s)  jsI   j = (s)  (s)    12 23 34 41 = 0; (A.5)
where I is the identity matrix and (s) and   (s) are:
(s) 
 
s    33
 
s    22

   34 43; (A.6)
  (s)  s
 
s    22

   12 21: (A.7)
We can rewrite P(s) as:
P(s) = s4 + a3s3 + a2s2 + a1s + a0 = 0; (A.8)
34where the a0
is are dened as:
a3   tr() =  (2 22 +  33) < 0; (A.9)
a2   2
22    12 21 + 2 22 33    34 43; (A.10)
a1   12 21( 22 +  33) +  22
 34 43    22 33

; (A.11)




(!X   !A) > 0: (A.12)
The positive determinant may indicate various cases: (i) two positive roots and two nega-
tive roots; (ii) four positive roots (in which case the system is unstable); and (iii) four negative
roots, giving rise to an indeterminate steady state (cf. Benhabib and Farmer, 1994, p. 30).
The third case is excluded because of tr() > 0. To distinguish between cases (i) and (ii), we
use Routh's criterion (cf. Shi and Epstein, 1993), which considers the number of sequential
sign changes in the Routh scheme as an indicator of the number of unstable roots.29 Based
on the Routh analysis and the numerical results in Section 5, we nd that the rst is the
relevant case. Therefore, the system (19) has a unique and locally saddle-point stable steady
state, featuring four characteristic roots; that is, two stable real roots denoted by  h
1 < 0
and  h
2 < 0 and two unstable real roots denoted by r
1 > 0 and r
2 > 0.
A.2 Solving for the Comparative Dynamics
A.2.1 The Transformed Model
We will make use of the Laplace transform technique to analyze the model (cf. Judd, 1982).





Intuitively, Lfx;sg represents the present value of x(t) using s as the discount rate.
29See Heijdra and Ligthart (2008) for further details on this analysis.


























f~ q(0)   Lfq;sg
~ X(0)

















where adj(s) is the adjoint matrix of (s). By pre-multiplying both sides of (A.14) by





























~ q(0)   Lfq;sg
~ X(0)




















s    22

(s)  12(s)  12 23
 
s    22
  12 23 34
 21(s) +  23 34 41 s(s)  23s
 
s    22
  23 34s
 34 41
 
s    22
  12 34 41
 
s    22

  (s)  34  (s)
 41
 
s    22
 
s    33
  12 41
 
s    33
  43  (s) +  12 23 41
 










30We have made use of Lf_ ~ q;sg = sLf~ q(t);sg   ~ q(0). In addition, we note that ~ K(0) = 0 and ~ A(0) 6= 0 due
to unanticipated capital gains/losses, that is, ~ A(0) = !A~ q (0).
36A.2.2 Impulse Response Functions
We have two jumping variables [~ q(t) and ~ X(t)] so that we need to impose only two initial
conditions. The values of ~ q (0) and ~ X(0) are such that the right-hand side of (A.16) is of the
0  0 type for both unstable roots r
1 and r
2.31 Using the rst row of adj(s), for example,
we get for s = r
1 and s = r
2:

(s) +  23 34!A

~ q (0) +  23
 
s    22
 ~ X (0) = (s)Lfq;sg +  23 34LfA;sg: (A.17)













1) +  23 34!A  23
 
r
1    22

(r
2) +  23 34!A  23
 
r



















The transitional dynamics follow from the analytical impulse response functions, which
can be derived following the steps set out in Bom, Heijdra, and Ligthart (2010). As can be
seen from (20){(21), the most general shock takes the following form:





[yg + (Y   1)K] ~ IG; qt   
rK
Y !A





 ~ IG; At  r!wwg~ IG:
We employ the following denitions for the temporary transition terms Tl(:) for l = f1;2;3g
31The denominator on the right-hand side of (A.16) is zero. The only way to obtain bounded solutions for
the four key variables is that the numerator on the right-hand side is also zero.






























; x 6= u: (A.22)
The path for the private capital stock is:
~ K (t) =  12~ q (0)T1 (h
1;h
2;t)    12









  34 43    22 33








The impulse response function for Tobin's q is:




2    22    33






~ q (0)T2 (h
1;h
2;t) + G







The paths for full consumption and nancial assets are, respectively:
~ X(t) =
h


































2    22    33








2;t) +  12 33









G +  33







38Table A1: Summary of the Log-Linearized Model
(a) Dynamic Equations
_ ~ K(t) =
r!I
!A
[~ I(t)   ~ K(t)] (TA.1)
_ ~ q(t) = r~ q(t)  
rK
Y !A
[~ Y (t)   ~ K(t) + (Y   1)K ~ KG(t)] (TA.2)







_ ~ A(t) = r
h
~ A(t) + !w ~ w(t)   ~ T(t)   !X ~ X(t)
i
(TA.4)
_ ~ KG(t) = G[~ IG   ~ KG(t)] (TA.5)
(b) Static Equations:





~ Y (t)   ~ L(t) + (Y   1)L ~ KG(t)
i
(TA.7)
~ Y (t) = K ~ K(t) + L~ L(t) + G ~ KG(t); (TA.8)
~ L(t) = !LL[ ~ w(t)   ~ X(t)] (TA.9)
~ C(t) = ~ X(t) (TA.10)
~ F(t) = ~ A(t)   !A[~ q(t) + ~ K(t)] (TA.11)
~ T(t) = !I
G~ IG(t) + !C
G ~ CG(t) (TA.12)
Notes: The following denitions are used: K  (YKK=Y )0, L  (YLL=Y )0, G  (YGKG=Y )0, !A 
r(qK=Y )0, !I  I0=Y0, !
C
G  CG0=Y0, !
I
G  IG0=Y0, !w  w0=Y0, !LL  (1   L0)=L0, !X  X0=Y0,
A   (I=K)(
00=
0) > 0, and G  IG
0
G()=KG > 0. A tilde (~) denotes a relative change, for example,
~ C(t)  dC(t)=C0 for most variables. Financial assets, however, are scaled by steady-state output and multiplied
by r, for example, ~ A(t)  rdA(t)=Y0. Lump-sum taxes are scaled by output, that is, ~ T(t)  dT(t)=Y0.
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